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Abstract 
This paper explores the concept of law in European integration studies with a particular 
emphasis on the conception adopted in the Integration Through Law project which was based 
in the European University Institute in the 1980s. It argues that notwithstanding claims to the 
contrary, the conception of law adopted in the project was a legal positivist one and that this 
is evidenced in its conception of law as the ‘object’ and ‘instrument’ of integration. The first 
part of the paper develops this thesis by arguing, firstly, that characterizing EU law as the 
‘object’ of integration entails a Razian conception of the authority of law which results in the 
integration of national legal systems, and then, secondly, that law as the ‘instrument’ of 
integration entails a functionalist conception of law which is necessarily positivist.  
The second part of the paper goes on to highlight the tension between this positivist 
conception of EU law and the federal principle which was central to the ITL project, given 
that the former relies on the resolution of the question of ultimate authority (the sources thesis 
brand of positivism) whereas the latter tends towards its irresolution. It argues that the 
emerging literature on constitutional pluralism in the EU implicitly endorses the federal 
principle of the ITL project at the cost of the positivist conception of EU law and that this is 
evidenced by the shift in models of constitutional pluralism from legal positivist conceptions 
of law to a more Dworkinian ‘principled’ form as exemplified in the work of Mattias Kumm. 
However, the paper concludes that this shift comes at a price which is potentially problematic 
in a fragile political community such as the EU, where the stakes are much higher than that of 
the sovereign state. 
 
Keywords 
European integretation, integration through law, constitutionalism, constitutional theory, 
constitutionalisation, federalism, sovereignty, legal positivism, functionalism, constitutional 
pluralism 
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1. Introduction! 
Notwithstanding the centrality of law in the European integration experience, the law of 
European integration, that is to say European Union (EU) law, has been relatively neglected 
by legal philosophers and has remained a relatively unexplored aspect of European 
integration studies more generally.
1
 Unlike International law, which is emerging from an 
‘ontological’ crisis
2
 into a ‘post-ontological’ phase in its theorisation,
3
 EU legal studies has 
almost complacently accepted or reaffirmed the law-like status of the norms which are 
contained in the treaties which established the EU.
4
 Where theorisation of the norms of EU 
law has taken place, it has tended to be focused on the first order question of what category of 
law it falls into, international or constitutional
5
—a debate which parallels debates in 
international relations regarding the intergovernmental or supranational nature of the EU as a 
political actor
6
—rather than the second order question of what constitutes law and whether 
the norms which emanate from the EU qualify.  
The question of the nature of EU law has a significance beyond the ponderings of 
legal philosophers. It touches upon broader debates surrounding the EU, particularly its 
authority and legitimacy, most clearly expressed in debates about its democratic pedigree (or 
lack thereof).
7
 Moreover, or perhaps because of, its unusual supranational setting, the 
question of the nature of EU law affects the question of the nature of the EU more generally 
as an emerging polity, and in this regard legal philosophy can contribute to debates in 
political philosophy which has recently turned its attention to the theorisation of the EU.
8
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! My thanks to Daniel Augenstein and Claudio Michelon for comments on a previous draft of this paper. 
1 The notable exception to this is the work of Neil MacCormick, whose writings on the nature of EU law and 
sovereignty are contained in Questioning Sovereignty, (Oxford University Press, 1999).  
2 J. Tasiuolas, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of 
International Law, (Oxford, 2010), 97. 
3 T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: 1995), 6 cited in Tasioulas (2010). 
4 Given that the Lisbon reforms have simplified the EU’s institutional structure by creating a single EU, I will 
refer to ‘EU’ throughout, incorporating its predecessors the EEC/EC. 
5 For an example of this debate see J. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, (Cambridge: 1999), Chapter 9. 
6 See T. Diez and A. Wiener, ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory’ in A. Wiener and T. Diez, 
European Integration Theory, (Oxford: 2009). 
7 See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union’ (2002) 40(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 603 and A. Follesdal and S. Hix, ‘Why there 
is a Democratic Deficit in the EU’ (2006) 44(3) Journal of Common Market Studies 533-562.  
8 H. Friese and P. Wagner, ‘The Nascent Political Philosophy of the European Polity’ (2002) 10(3) The Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 342-364; R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, ‘Legitimizing the Euro-‘polity’ and its 
‘Regime’: The Normative Turn in EU Studies’, (2003) 2(7) European Journal of Political Theory, 7-34.  
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  Arguably, the most important factor influencing accounts of EU law was the 
development of the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy by the European Court of 
Justice
9
 (ECJ) which distinguished the EU’s legal order from ‘classic’ international law and 
provided the catalyst for EU constitutional discourse.
10
 These doctrines, which defined the 
nature of the legal system established under the EU’s founding treaties, have left an indelible 
mark on the concept of law which dominates EU legal studies, including that adopted in the 
influential Integration Through Law (ITL) project.
11
 The significance of these doctrines with 
respect to a theory of EU law were that EU law was better theorised as a domestic 
constitutional legal system and not a species of international law.
12
 Thus, from the point of 
view of legal philosophy, the most relevant theoretical accounts of law for the EU were those 
developed in the state context, such as that of Hobbes and Bentham, or more latterly Kelsen, 
Hart and Raz, than some sort of ius gentium entailing International law’s deficiencies in 
respect of the hallmarks of legality.
13
 On this constitutional reading, then, the EU treaty 
system was compatible with having a Kelsenian basic norm presupposed in relation to it,
14
 or 
had prompted a change in the national rule of recognition where national laws were 
subordinate to conflicting provisions of EU law.
15
 
That the domestic ‘constitutional’ premise informed the concept of law employed in 
the ITL project with respect to the EU context was clear from the introductory chapter to this 
important groundbreaking study.
16
 The setting of the project within a federal and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 13; Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
10 For an overview of the various discourses in EU constitutionalism, see C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘The European 
Union’s Constitutional Mosaic: Big ‘C’ or Small ‘c’, Is that the Question? in N. Walker, J. Shaw and S. Tierney 
(eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Hart, 2011). 
11 M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler, International Through Law: Europe and the American 
Federal Experience/3 Vols. (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1985). This study is very wide-ranging and covers a 
number of jurisdictions. In this contribution I will talk exclusively about the claims of the project which are 
relevant for the EU integration experience with a particular emphasis on the introductory chapter to the entire 
project which provides a comprehensive over view of the general approach taken in the study. 
12 See Weiler, (1999), Chapter 9. 
13 Tasioulas, (2010), 97. 
14 For discussion in the EU context, see Catherine Richmond, ‘Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, 
System and Sovereignty in European Law’ (1997) 16(4) Law and Philosophy 337.  
15 Hart, The Concept of Law, (Clarendon, 1994), 94. For a discussion of this in the UK context, see P. Craig, 
‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom after Factortame’ (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law, 221.  
16 M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘International Through Law: European and the American 
Federal Experience, A General Introduction’ in M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler, International 
Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience/Vol. 1, Methods, tools, and institutions, 
(Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1985). Hereinafter ITLI.  
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constitutional framework
17
 presaged the domestic jurisprudential setting within which the 
study was set. The comparison between the EU and other constitutional federal polities, 
entities such as the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland,
18
 simply served to 
emphasise the constitutional jurisprudential credentials of EU law. In this way, the federal-
constitutional setting was distinguished from the relative anarchy of international law.
19
  
In this contribution, the concept of law adopted in the ITL project will be 
interrogated. The following section will argue that, notwithstanding claims to the contrary in 
the project itself, that the concept of law adopted in ITL was a legal positivist one. This claim 
is pursued by analysing the characterisation of law in the project as the object and instrument 
of integration. The subsequent section argues that such a positivist conception of the law of 
European integration, with its emphasis on sources and unitariness,
20
 is in tension with the 
constitutive frame of the ITL project; the federal principle.
21
 This is explained by the fact that 
whereas the former insists on the resolution of the question of final authority vis-à-vis the EU 
and national legal systems, the latter tends towards its irresolution. In the ensuing section, it 
will be argued that until relatively recently, the positivist approach to EU law has dominated 
EU studies at the expense of the federal principle. This situation is changing with the advent 
of constitutional pluralism in EU legal studies, which militates in favour of the federal 
principle and the irresolution of the question of final authority in EU law. This development 
in turn raises questions regarding the continuing relevance of positive law in European 
integration and, by implication, the relevance of the ITL project to contemporary EU legal 
studies; themes which are briefly considered prior to the conclusion.  
2. Supranational Legal Positivism: law as object and instrument 
In the introduction to the ITL project, the editors outlined the comparative method which was 
to constitute both the methodology and philosophy of the study.
22
 This comparative method 
served to reveal ‘actual societal problems and needs, developments and trends, shared by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 ITLI, 6-10. 
18 Cappelletti et al (1985). 
19 ‘The distinction between an international and a federal system lies in the fact that in the federal system, the 
“central” authority partially replaces the state government in a direct governmental relationship with the people, 
and that within the areas of federal competence the states are no longer considered as sovereign subjects, but 
rather are subordinated to the federal authority’. ITLI, 27. 
20 See below. 
21 ITLI, 12. 
22 ITLI, 5. 
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certain societies.’
23
 More strikingly from the point of view of legal philosophy, according to 
the authors, this historico-comparative method entailed a ‘third school of legal thinking’ 
which constituted a via media between legal positivism and natural law. As such it was 
‘different both from mere positivism, for which law is a pure datum not subject to evaluation, 
and from evaluation of such datum based on abstract, airy inevitably subjective criteria such 
as “natural law” principles’.
24
 Notwithstanding these claims, the jurisprudential implications 
of this ‘third school’ of legal thinking are not unpacked in the introduction. Rather, the 
emphasis is placed on extrapolating issues of federal theory and comparative politics.
25
  
Whereas this comparative approach and the overall study itself were ground-breaking, 
particularly as means of shedding light on what was then (and is still to an extent now) a 
rather nebulous and almost wholly misunderstood EEC/EU, it is not clear, from the point of 
view of legal philosophy, how the ‘third school’ approach ploughed a new furrow between 
the traditional trenches of natural law and legal positivism. Indeed, it is the contention of this 
contribution that the conception of law adopted in the ITL project was, notwithstanding the 
claims to the contrary, a positivist one. 
Perhaps one of the most well-known aspects of the ITL project was its 
characterisation of the role of law in the process of integration. It was set out quite clearly at 
the beginning of the study, that law was to constitute both the ‘object’ and ‘instrument’ of 
European integration.
26
 This characterisation of law, far from forging a third way in legal 
philosophy puts the concept of law in the ITL project squarely within the domain of legal 
positivism.  
Legal positivism is a broad area of scholarship in legal philosophy which deals with 
questions regarding the nature and existence conditions of law.
27
 Perhaps at its most basic, 
the various strands of positivist thought converge with respect to their insistence on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 ITLI, 5. 
24 ITLI, 5. 
25 ITLI, 5 et seq. This is supported by the fact that the approach to law seems to be based on a nebulous ‘federal 
vision’: ‘By eschewing the temptation both of a strict natural-law-type a priori affirmation of a particular model 
of integration … and of the inward-looking positivistic visionless step-by-step approach … one may actually 
remain with a vision—of federal integration—while examining critically, and objectively, the permutations of 
different federal arrangements.’ ITLI, 8.  
26 ITLI, 15. 
27 See generally L. Green, “Legal Positivism” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ( 2003) , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/.  
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‘boundary’
28
 or ‘demarcation’
29
 question as to questions of legal validity; the ‘boundary’ 
itself relating to the extent to which, if at all, considerations of political morality are relevant 
to legal validity.
30
 This basic premise regarding the relationship of morals to legal validity is 
developed to various degrees in positivist thinking in different precepts, such as that the 
criteria for establishing whether a norm constitutes valid law does not, or should not, depend 
on its moral content,
31
 that morality may inform the sources of law but does not play any role 
in the formal recognition of legal validity,
32
 or that the adjudicatory process entails a political 
morality which is external to the concept of law itself.
33
 As will be illustrated, the 
characterisation of law as the object and instrument of integration each constitute a 
manifestation of legal positivism in that they rely on a ‘boundary’ between law and morals 
with regard to the validity of the law of European integration.  
A. Law as Object 
 In positing law as the object of integration, the ITL project countenanced the 
‘problems created by the interaction of several initially distinct legal systems under the 
umbrella of a central authority’.
34
 In the EU context, the target of this integration, the 
‘initially distinct legal systems’, were national legal orders. Central to the conception of law 
as the object of integration was the notion of a central authority which would coordinate and 
integrate these diverse national legal systems. This coordination and integration would itself 
occur through law, that is the norms of the EU legal system.
35
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 L. Murphy, ‘Concepts of Law’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 1. 
29 B. Leiter, ‘The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism’ in J. Ferrer & J. Moreso 
(eds.), Neutrality and the Theory of Law, (Madrid, Marcial Pons: 2011). 
30 For a classic account see H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,’ (1958) 71 
Harvard Law Review 593 
31 Often referred to as ‘hard’ or ‘exclusive’ positivism. 
32 Frequently referred to as ‘soft’ or ‘inclusive’ positivism. 
33 For a discussion of this particular point, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 
1978), Chapter 2. 
34 ITLI, 15. 
35 The notion of law as the instrument or agent of EU integration (see below) can also be of relevance here in 
the sense that EU law as authoritative law can be seen as the agent propelling further integration. This is not the 
sense in which I mean law as instrument in this chapter which is further explained below. I would like to thank 
Daniel Augenstein for bringing this point to my attention. 
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This is explained by the fact that the integration of national legal systems could only 
occur through their simultaneous conforming to the provisions of (superior) EU law.
36
 
However, EU law could only play the role of the momentum behind the integration of 
national legal systems if it acted as a credible superior law. The building blocks for EU law 
as superior and authoritative law were put in place with the ECJ’s insistence upon the 
supremacy of EU law.
37
 Thus, the idea of law as the object of integration, instrumentalised 
through the supremacy doctrine, implied a conception of EU law as authority. It is argued 
that Raz’s analytical account of the authority of law and legal norms best explains the idea of 
law as the object of integration through coordinating national legal systems under its own 
supremacy or authority.  
Briefly, Raz’s conception of authority and legal obligation is predicated on a 
distinction between first order and second order reasons for action in practical reasoning.
38
 
This distinction emerges from the fact that conflicts between first order reasons and first 
order and second order reasons are qualitatively different.
39
 First order reasons entail making 
a decision based on the preponderance of the balance of reasons, considering the relative 
weight of competing reasons.
40
 Secondary reasons are of a different nature, providing 
exclusionary reasons for action regardless of the preponderance of the balance of first order 
reasons.
41
 That is, that second order reasons provide reasons for refraining from acting on the 
preponderance on the balance of first order reasons.
42
 In this way, then, second order 
exclusionary reasons are categorical and pre-emptive,
43
 in that their weight in practical 
reason does not rely on an assessment of their content through a process of rational 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 It is the notion of EU law as superior law is one of the central tenets of EU constitutionalism. See Weiler, 
(1999), Mac Amhlaigh, (2010). On the specifically integrative function of constitutionalism, see D. Grimm, 
‘Integration by Constitution’ (2005) 3(2‐3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 193  
37 Costa (1963). 
38 J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, (Hutchinson, 1975), 36. Hereinafter PRN. 
39 PRN, 36. 
40 PRN, 36. 
41 PRN, 39. 
42 PRN, 39. In Raz’s terminology: ‘If p is a reason for x to ! and q is an exclusionary reason for him not to act 
on p then p and q are not strictly conflicting reasons. q is not a reason for not !-ing. It is a reason for not !-ing 
for the reason that p. The conflict between p and q is a conflict between a first-order reason and a second-order 
exclusionary reason. Such conflicts are resolved not by the strength of the competing reasons but by a general 
principle of practical reason which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail, when in conflict with 
first-order reasons.’  
43 L. Green, ‘Legal Obligation and Authority’ in E. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2003) p. 
6; http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/. 
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deliberation, but rather on their authoritative nature.
44
 For Raz, certain norms must be 
regarded as second-order exclusionary reasons, in particular those which are issued by an 
authority justified by the need to secure coordination.
45
 Legal norms therefore provide 
exclusionary second-order reasons for action independently of the content of the norm itself.  
That this conception of law constitutes a form of legal positivism is clear from Raz’s 
justification of authority based on its function of societal coordination.
46
 One of the functions 
of authority is the provision of benefits to its subjects in the form of coordination and gives 
them reasons for following the dictates of the authority. However, this function of authority 
cannot be achieved unless the norms provide content-independent exclusionary reasons for 
action. If the decision of whether to follow a norm issued by an authority is open to 
deliberation as to its content, then it would cease to be authoritative and its purpose and 
utility would be thwarted.
47
 Raz argues that given that we disagree as to what, precisely, can 
be morally justified, the authority of law in particular (entailing questions of legal validity) 
cannot be based on such contested moral precepts.
48
 Thus, for law to constitute authority, its 
validity must be established independently of contested notions of morality.  
In applying this scheme of authority to the EU context, and the authority of EU law in 
particular, the norms of EU law constitute second order exclusionary reasons as against the 
norms of national law which constitute first order reasons. The authoritative nature of EU 
law—which law as the object of integration entails—requires that national legal actors must 
view the norms of EU law as authoritative and therefore as second order exclusionary 
reasons for deciding cases. Thus, when a norm of EU law is applicable to a particular case, 
national courts must base a judicial decision on the categorical and pre-emptive authority of 
EU law and emphatically not engage in a balancing exercise on the relative merits of the EU 
norm vis-à-vis the national norm. Law as the object of integration implies that EU law is 
applied even if, on the balance of first order reasons the case would be decided differently, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 ‘Such conflicts are resolved not by the strength of the competing reasons but by a general principle of 
practical reasons which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail, when in conflict with first-order 
reasons’, PRN, 40. 
45 PRN, 74. He notes elsewhere that ‘[t]o regard a person as having authority is to regard at least some of his 
orders or other expressions of his views as to what is to be done … as authoritative instructions, and therefore as 
exclusionary reasons’, PRN, 58-9 
46 PRN, 74. 
47 RPN, 79. 
48 ‘[T]he subjects of any authority … can benefit by its decisions only if they can establish their existence and 
content in ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the authority is there to settle’. Raz, 
Ethics in the Public Domain, (Oxford, 1995), 203. 
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due to the fact that, for example, a national provision protecting fundamental rights was at 
stake. To do otherwise would be to undermine the authority of EU law and would vitiate the 
role of EU law as the object of integration.  
B. Law as Instrument 
The second characterisation of law in the ITL project, as the instrument or agent of 
integration, also entails a legal positivist conception of EU law. As the introduction to the 
project states, law as the instrument of integration implies that law is ‘but one of many social 
instruments harnessed to achieve a wider societal objective’.
49
 Thus, in the EU context, law is 
the catalyst for the integration of other social spheres such as the economic through, for 
example, the establishment and development of the single market through the free movement 
of the factors of production and an open regime of competition.
50
  
That the conception of law which underpins this idea is a positivist one is clear from 
the emphasis on law as a functional tool or ‘social technology’. On this account, law is a 
means to some (political) end
51
 such as the alleviation of poverty, the maximisation of 
general welfare or, more abstractly, the maintenance and stabilisation of societal expectations 
despite disappointment.
52
 Whereas the ends to which law can be put are, on the functionalist 
account, diverse,
53
 the question of the validity of law on the functionalist account must be 
determined independently of political or moral considerations. Simply put, if law is to 
achieve an undefined array of aims in society, and therefore fulfil its functional promise, then 
the conditions for its existence as law cannot rely on evaluative criteria such as moral or 
political principles.
54
 If the criteria for legal validity were ideologically loaded, then it would 
fail as a functional tool. Central to the functionalist account and its positivist character is 
law’s neutrality in the face of rival political and moral preferences. It is precisely the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 ITLI, 42. 
50 See generally, Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 2007 C 306. 
51 See Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End, (Cambridge, 2006), Chapter 7. 
52 N. Luhmann, Law as Social System, K. Ziegert trans. (Oxford: 2004), Chapter 3. 
53 It is clear that there are limits to what law can achieve, even on a strongly functionalist account. However, 
for current purposes, the function of law is at least as broad as the various aims of government policy 
encapsulating both sides of the political divide. Thus, law can be used both to establish a strong social welfare 
state as well as defend a strongly neo-liberal political agenda. See Tamanaha (2006).  
54 M. Loughlin, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law: An Interpretation’ (2005) Public Law, 48-66. For current 
purposes I am bracketing the broader critical challenge that the law itself, in terms of its methodology and 
procedure, entailing questions of standing and legal right, envisages a (politically biased) atomistic view of 
society. For discussion see XXX? I would like to thank Claudio Michelon for bringing this point to my 
attention. 
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separation between law and morals on questions of legal validity which secures law’s 
neutrality (that is lack of moral or political bias) and thus ensures its versatility and functional 
capability as a tool of social engineering.
55
 As Raz notes, ‘it is of the essence of law to guide 
behaviour through rules and courts in charge of their application … Like other instruments, 
the law has a specific virtue which is morally neutral in being neutral as to the end which the 
instrument is put’.
56
 Thus, if law is simply a functional tool, the message which it carries, or 
the facts with which it engages, can be ‘progressive or reactionary, just or unjust, moral or 
immoral’
57
 but none of these factors affect in any way its status as law.  
 There is a strong affinity between the ITL project’s characterisation of law as the 
instrument of integration and one of the predominant early political theories of European 
integration; namely neo-functionalism.
58
 As a theory of European integration, neo-
functionalism provided an explanation of the European integration process based on a ‘spill-
over’ effect, which envisaged the ‘spilling over’ of one area of integration into another, in 
which law played a central role.
59
 This is illustrated, for example, by reference to ‘the spilling 
over of community legal regulation from the narrowly economic domain into areas dealing 
with issues such as occupational health and safety, social welfare, education, and even 
political participation rights’.
 60
 In this way, the gradual integration of a variety of social and 
political fields would be ensured as ‘externalities’ of the application of EU law. In the EU 
context in particular, a functionalist (and therefore positivist) conception of law was a 
particularly suitable medium to carry out this task, due to its politically neutral nature.
61
 
Filling the empty vessel of positive law with market-making and integrationist tendencies 
such as, for example, legal prohibitions on discriminatory taxes, would have effects not just 
in areas of taxation or economic policy but would also influence other areas affecting perhaps 
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55 Loughlin, (2005). 
56 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ in The Authority of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), 225-6. 
Emphasis Added.  
57 Loughlin, (2005), 53. 
58 Generally associated with the work of Ernst Haas: E. Hass, The Uniting of Europe, (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1958). See also A. Niemann & P. Schmitter, ‘Neofunctionalism’ in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), European 
Integration Theory, (Oxford: OUP, 2009). On the role of law in neo-functionalist theory, see G. de Búrca, 
‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’ (2005) 12(2) Journal of European Public Policy, 310-326.  
59 de Búrca, (2005), 315.  
60 A. Burely and W. Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: a political theory of legal integration’ (1993) 47(1) 
International Organization 41-77, 43. 
61 Although it didn’t feature strongly in early neo-functionalist literature. de Búrca, (2005), 311. 
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more profound moral or political choices.
62
 The ‘expansionary tendencies of law’
63
 would 
advance the cause of integration in a way that other forms of social interaction, such as 
economics, religion or perhaps most importantly politics, could not. 
3. Legal Positivism and European Integration 
If the preceding argument that an account of law as the object and instrument of integration 
entails a legal positivist concept of law is sound, this has important implications for European 
integration more generally. Perhaps the most salient impact of a positivist conception of EU 
law on European integration is the subordination of national law to EU law, and national 
authority to the authority of the EU. This can be explained by legal positivism’s insistence on 
sources, and one source in particular, as the criteria for legal validity.
64
 Moreover, the single 
source of law maintains the internal coherence and systemic nature of the legal system by 
ensuring that all the norms of the system cohere with the source of law which is in a 
hierarchical relationship to all the other norms of the system.
65
  
Legal positivism, therefore, entails a clear resolution of the question of ultimate 
authority in a political system. The existence or claim that a legal system is one of positive 
law, therefore presupposes the resolution of the question of ultimate authority in favour of the 
source of that law. In a state setting, this point is relatively uncontroversial, where the 
question of ultimate authority is relatively settled in the notion of state sovereignty. However, 
in a more ambiguous legal context, such as that of the EU, the effect of a positivist 
conception of EU law is the creation of a strong centripetal effect towards unity and 
centralisation at the EU level, due to the reflexivity of law and politics.
66
 Thus, the 
conception of EU law adopted in the ITL project entailed a bias towards unity and hierarchy 
and increased centralisation at the level of the EU.
67
 In this regard it is hardly surprising that 
the orthodox view of legal integration was that law and integration were ‘naturally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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compatible’
68
 such that compliance and obedience to European law inevitably meant more 
integration.
69
  
However, perhaps more significantly from the viewpoint of the ITL project, this 
positivist conception of law was in tension with the ‘federal vision’ which framed the study.
70
 
As the introduction makes clear, this federal frame was not to be confused with examples of 
federal states such as the US or Germany which, notwithstanding the federal tag, have 
actually evolved as centralised or unitary states.
71
 Rather, the federal principle entailed the 
‘entire frame and not merely a centre around which the periphery coalesces’.
72
 This version 
of the federal idea is similar to what Morgan has called ‘genuine federalism’.
73
 This account 
of federalism seeks the: ‘dispersal rather than concentration of power in a centralised political 
authority ... [and is] critical of the sovereignty principle and the modern nation-state, which 
[it] seek[s] to replace with a decentralised federal polity.’
74
  
The ITL’s federal principle as opposed to a federal state, then entails an elemental 
ambiguity with regard to the question of ultimate authority, leaving it an open question as to 
whether ultimate authority lies with the centralised federal authority or at the level of the 
federal units. Thus, the federal principle signifies more than the mere existence of a two-tier 
system of government but rather, and more importantly, denotes the irresolution of the 
question of ultimate authority in the system. This federalist endorsement of the irresolution of 
the question of ultimate authority is therefore in clear tension with legal positivism’s 
insistence on its resolution.
75
  
4. Constitutional Pluralism and the Rise of the Federal Principle 
Notwithstanding the prominence of the federal principle in the ITL project, it is arguably no 
exaggeration that it was a positivist conception of law which dominated legal practice and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 J. Shaw, “European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 231, 233. 
69 Shaw (1996), 237. 
70 ILTI, 8. 
71 ITLI, 13. 
72 ITLI, 14. 
73 G. Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate , (Princeton, 2004) 12. 
74 Morgan (2004). 
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they could also seem to suggest that if integration, as manifest in these concepts, were taken to its logical 
conclusion, it would not be consonant with the federal principle.” ITLI, 14. 
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academic scholarship in the early years of the integration experience, at the expense of the 
federal principle.
76
 As noted above, the supremacy doctrine of the ECJ was the lynchpin of 
the EU-law-as-positive-law school of thought, attempting a definitive resolution of the 
question of ultimate authority by unambiguously asserting the superiority and authority of 
EU law and emphatically not encouraging the opening of the question of ultimately authority 
to contestation. Thus, when the project was undertaken, the editors of the ITL project could 
still claim, with some assurance that:
77
 
‘On the legal level it would seem as if the major constitutional principles of the system—
direct effect, supremacy and the rest—have reached a certain maturity. What is now being 
called into question, however, is the day-to-day implementation of Community law, the 
incorporation of directives, the compliance with Community law, the obedience to the 
system’ 
 This perhaps slightly complacent but not wholly unwarranted observation was 
relevant to the times, when national constitutional courts, on the whole, applied European law 
(and those who did not had the good manners to keep reasonably quiet about it by simply 
ignoring EU law or refusing to make preliminary references). At least, that is, until national 
supreme courts started to become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the authority 
claims implicit in the supremacy of EU law and the centripetal tendencies of supranational 
legal positivism. These national courts, most notoriously perhaps the German Constitutional 
Court,
78
 disputed the positivist premises of EU law with its resolution of the question of 
ultimate authority in the EU legal space. This counter-narrative to the positivist-inspired 
supremacy of EU law and its centripetal tendencies claimed that the final authority of the 
system lay with their constitutions and their interpretation by these courts.
79
 Strictly 
speaking, this challenge from national constitutional courts did not constitute an assertion of 
the federal principle against the constitutional one, but rather pitted one legal positivism 
against another, the superiority of the EU system against the superiority of the national 
constitutional system. Therefore, rather than leaving the question of the final authority of the 
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EU legal system open, as the federal principle requires, national constitutional courts claimed 
that the question of final authority should be resolved in their favour.  
Even if the rival claims from the ECJ regarding the supremacy of EU law, and 
national constitutional courts claiming national constitutional supremacy is essentially a 
restatement of rival positivisms, more recent theorisation of this conflict under the banner of 
constitutional pluralism can be interpreted as the rise of the federal principle at the cost of the 
purely positivist conception of EU law.  
Constitutional Pluralism is a reasonably broad church which theorises the rival claims to 
ultimate authority between EU law and national constitutional law.
80
 What defines 
constitutional pluralism as a distinct theory of constitutional conflict, is its insistence that the 
rival authority claims by national and supranational actors be taken seriously, and not 
dismissed as either an illegitimate ‘power grab’ by supranational judicial actors, nor judicial 
parochialism on the part of national judicial actors. Thus the resolution of ultimate authority 
cannot be resolved by definitional or judicial fiat. Rather, as Walker notes, constitutional 
pluralism entails a fundamental epistemic dimension. According to this aspect of 
constitutional pluralism:
 81
 
 ‘It is only possible to identify the different sites [of claims to authority] as different 
units if we already acknowledge that the underlying symbolic work involved in representing 
each of these sites as units—and so also as unities—requires a different way of knowing and 
ordering, a different epistemic starting point and perspective with regard to each unit(y); and 
that so long as these different unit(ies) continue to be plausibly represented as such, there is 
no neutral perspective from which their distinct representational claims can be reconciled.’ 
The claims by national constitutional actors and the theorisation of the ensuing 
situation in terms of Constitutional Pluralism therefore, does not allow for a clear and 
definitive resolution of the question of ultimate authority between national and supranational 
actors. In this way, constitutional pluralism and the federal principle of the ITL project, are 
‘comfortable bedfellows’ in the sense that they both jettison a single and final resolution of 
the question of ultimate authority. However, if constitutional pluralism, like the federal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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principle, is predicated on the irresolution of ultimate authority, then what role is left in 
contemporary EU legal studies for the positivist conception of EU law which as central to the 
ITL project? If the question of ultimate authority is to remain unresolved, then a sources-
based conception of legal positivism is clearly incompatible with the newer federalist realities 
of European legal integration. The answer lies in a shift in constitutional pluralism 
approaches to EU legal integration from a legal positivist conception of EU law as contained 
in the ITL project to a broader concept of law which contains principles of political morality. 
  
Kumm’s model of constitutional pluralism for example, entitled European 
Constitutionalism beyond the State (ECS), is a particularly salient example of this trend.
82
 In 
devising principles of EU law to resolve constitutional conflicts, he identifies three scenarios 
when such conflicts may arise; cases where EU law runs the risk of violating fundamental 
rights protected in national constitutions,
83
 cases involving disputes regarding Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, that is which site, national or supranational, should patrol the jurisdictional 
boundaries in the EU constitutional space,
84
 and finally cases which involve conflicts 
between EU law and constitutional provisions which do not entail fundamental rights and 
might otherwise be the subject of ‘ordinary’ law such as restrictions on service in the armed 
forces based on sex.
85
  
To manage such conflicts Kumm enumerates a series of open-ended framework 
principles of European law applying to cases of constitutional conflicts between national and 
supranational law.
86
 The first of these principles is the principle of legality, entailing a 
presumption in favour of the effective and uniform enforcement of EU law, even where it 
putatively conflicts with provisions of national constitutional law.
87
 The presumption is 
rebuttable, however, by three sub-principles; fundamental rights protection, subsidiarity and 
democratic legitimacy.
88
 Thus, where a national court considers that a provision of EU law 
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fails to protect the aims of one of the three sub-principles, then it can set aside the provision 
of EU law in that particular legal controversy.  
These principles provide a ‘structuring device’
89
 for constitutional conflicts which 
ensures the optimisation of the uniform application of EU law, but not at the cost of 
compromising important values and principles of national constitutional law which may 
prevail in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, ECS is a resolutely constitutional pluralist 
approach in that it does not provide a ‘relatively hard and fast answer’
90
 to the relationship 
between national and supranational courts. Thus, the question of ultimate authority in the EU 
legal order is left unresolved, the principles providing a framework for ‘mutual deliberative 
engagement’
91
. 
Similarly, Maduro, in his thesis of ‘contrapuntal law’ develops principles which provide a 
‘common basis for discourse’
92
 between national and supranational legal actors engaged in 
resolving conflicts between the two systems. This model entails a commitment by all legal 
actors involved in the practice of EU law (both national and supranational) to this set of 
principles which are identified as the principles of pluralism;
93
 consistency and vertical 
coherence;
94
 universalisability,
95
 and institutional choice.
96
  
What is significant in this turn to principles of constitutional pluralism to manage 
constitutional conflicts regarding EU law contained in Kumm and Maduro’s models, is that, 
as noted, they expand the conception of law employed in EU legal studies from the positivist-
inspired law of the ITL project to one in which principles of political morality (in this case 
principles of constitutional pluralism) are immanent in the concept of EU law itself and not 
excluded by rigid criteria of legal validity such as rules of recognition.
97
 In this regard, such a 
principled concept of EU law does not insist on the strict boundary between legal rules and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 JCC, 300. 
90 JCC, 300. 
91 JCC, 301. 
92 M. Maduro,’ Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N. Walker (ed.), 
Sovereignty in Transition, (Oxford, Hart, 2003), 524.. 
93 Maduro (2003), 526. 
94 That is a commitment by national courts to the coherence of the EU legal order, Maduro (2003), 527. 
95 That national court decisions should be susceptible to justification in universal terms, and notably according 
to the EU legal order, Maduro, (2003), 529. 
96 That a variety of institutions can take part in managing constitutional conflicts, Maduro, (2003), 530. 
97 See Hart, (1994). 
!
moral principles and rule-based criteria for legal validity,
98
 but offers a Dworkinian-inspired 
conception of law
99
 where the boundary between law and morality is at least perforated if not 
completely dissolved. This shift in the concept of EU law is explicitly acknowledged by 
Kumm in his account of the law of ECS which:
100
  
‘insists on the central role of principles of political morality—principles that are not only 
substantive, but also procedural and jurisdictional—as an integral part of any plausible 
conception of law in the liberal democratic constitutional tradition’  
In terms of constitutional conflict then, as outlined above, the ‘principled’ conception of 
EU law presupposes the existence of political or moral principles which are embedded in the 
EU’s legal order. Moreover, such principled accounts of EU law are a vindication of the 
ITL’s federal principle where the answer to the question of the locus of ultimate authority 
through the application of EU law or national law, will vary from case to case and is 
ultimately contingent on the application of the framework principles of constitutional 
pluralism. Maduro’s metaphor of counter-point, the musical device where different voices 
follow an independent melody but remain in harmony with each other, provides a particularly 
graphic illustration of the open-ended nature of the principles of constitutional pluralism as 
one voice cannot dominate or drown out the others.  
5. The Twilight of Integration Through (positive) Law? 
As was argued above, the ITL project entailed a positivist-inspired concept of law which was 
analogous to domestic positive law. Moreover, the supremacy doctrine was central to this 
EU-law-as-legal-positivism school of thought entailing the harmonisation and centralisation 
of national law under the authority of EU law. This assumption has been forcefully 
challenged in the past two decades, largely due to the assertion of national constitutional 
supremacy by national courts in cases of constitutional conflict with EU law. This, in turn, 
has given rise to a new paradigm of EU law, constitutional pluralism, which is predicated on 
a ‘principled account’ of EU law and therefore represents a shift away from positivist 
conceptions of law such as that contained in the ITL project. Moreover, the effect of this 
‘principled turn’ in EU legal studies, is a diminution of a positivist conception of EU law and 
the augmentation of the federal principle, given that the former requires the resolution of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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question of ultimate authority in the EU legal order, whereas the latter tends towards its 
irresolution. 
Notwithstanding these developments, it would be foolhardy to exaggerate the 
significance of the EU’s constitutional conflicts,
101
 and perhaps more importantly the 
relevance or impact of theoretical accounts of EU law on the practice of EU law, whether at 
the national or supranational levels.
102
 However, the evolution of constitutional pluralism and 
its principled conception of law raise questions as to the continuing relevance of law in 
European integration more generally. It is beyond the scope of this brief contribution to 
explore these issues in any detail, however, I would like to briefly sketch one potential 
problem with the development of constitutional pluralism and its principled conception of EU 
law which question the continuing predominance of law in the integration process. This 
problem reflects a ‘Hobbesian objection’ to the insertion of principles of political morality 
into a supranational conception of law. This Hobbesian objection is loosely based on Hobbes’ 
justification of sovereignty and relates to the necessity of an over-arching sovereign decision 
maker to resolve societal disputes in order to ensure societal coordination.
103
 For Hobbes, the 
state of nature was characterised by deep disagreement and potentially violent conflict which 
could be avoided by a mutual submission to sovereign authority. This sovereign was to be all 
powerful in order to avoid the re-emergence of the conflicts of the state of nature and 
required the unwavering respect and obedience of its subjects.
104
 If the obedience to the 
sovereign was conditional, then the purpose of sovereignty in releasing individuals from the 
violence of the state of nature would be thwarted. In this way Hobbes warned against: 
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‘the potential evils that might be expected to afflict societies whose members were unable to 
disentangle their judgments about what was required or permitted by the law of their society 
from their individual judgments about justice and morality’.
105
  
This Hobbesian justification of authority translates into legal theory in terms of a 
sources-based positivist concept of law defended by, inter alia, Raz
106
 and employed in the 
ITL project. The principled account of law in the constitutional pluralist literature, however, 
undermines this functionality by bringing such contestation into the concept of law itself.
107
 
In practice, what the insertion of principles of morality into the conception of EU law does is 
to undermine its authority. As noted above, according to a purely positivist conception of EU 
law as supported by the supremacy doctrine, when a national court is faced with resolving a 
legal problem which involves EU law, then the authority of EU law provides an exclusionary 
reason for not deciding the case on the balance of reasons involving national law. What the 
principles of constitutional pluralism elaborated by Kumm and Maduro require is that 
national courts now engage in a balancing exercise involving the ‘higher order’ or 
‘framework’ principles of constitutional pluralism. Thus, EU law is deprived of its status as 
authority providing second order exclusionary reasons for deciding a case, and becomes 
merely a first order reason competing with other reasons (provisions of national law) which 
will be determined on the preponderance of the balance of reasons. This relegation of EU law 
norms to first order reasons therefore undermines the role of EU law in European integration 
such that its status as the object and instrument of integration is called into question.  
This problem has been extensively explored in legal philosophy, particularly in 
response to Dworkin’s conception of law, and will not be examined in more detail here.
108
 
Rather, I wish to briefly consider the ‘Hobbesian objection’ to a principled account of law in 
respect of the characterisation of the EU legal order. Clearly, any account of law which 
attempts to perforate the strict boundary between legal validity and morality undermines this 
essential justification of authority in terms of positive law. However, it is argued that these 
concerns apply a fortiori in the EU context and can have particular unintended consequences 
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given that, as the ITL project showcased, law had been so central to the creation of the EU as 
a polity, largely due to the fact that it lacked a pre-existing ‘political way of being’.
109
  
Disagreement trails on the coat-tails of principles of political morality and therefore 
into the concept of EU law affecting its authoritative and pre-emptive nature. Given the deep 
disagreement surrounding the nature of the EU including its purpose and aims,
110
 the 
identification of principles of constitutional pluralism are themselves contestable. Thus, while 
both Kumm and Maduro provide sophisticated justifications of the principles of 
constitutional pluralism which they elaborate, the very fact that they represent particular 
normative political standpoints means that they are not dispositive. Therefore, disagreement 
can thus emerge as to what precisely the principles of constitutional pluralism are or should 
be. A strong state-sovereigntist or constitutional nationalist viewing European integration in 
terms of a ‘Europe of sovereign states’, may disagree entirely with the principles of pluralism 
or universalisability highlighted by Maduro, and the presumption in favour of EU law as 
implicit in Kumm’s principle of legality. Should such an individual find themselves sitting on 
the bench of a national supreme or constitutional court, they would feel completely justified 
in disregarding them.
111
  
Furthermore, even where a basic set of framework principles of Constitutional 
Pluralism could be agreed upon, the precise meaning of such principles could vary 
throughout the 27 jurisdictions of the EU, making the notion of principle as a uniform 
standard binding across all jurisdictions a chimera. This could also create a serious problem 
of free-riders, where national courts pay lip-service to the principles of constitutional 
pluralism thereby reaping the benefits of integration without surrendering decisional 
autonomy in sensitive matters of public policy. In sum, whereas the risks identified by 
Hobbesian objection to principled concepts of law apply to any legal system, in a precarious 
political setting such as the EU, they are particularly acute.  
6. Conclusion 
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The ITL project highlighted the central role of positive law in European integration as 
an alternative way of managing international relations to traditional purely political methods 
such as balance of power politics. Law in this context provided reasons for action based on its 
own authority and not political preferences or strategic interests.  
The emergence of constitutional conflict, constitutional pluralism and the principled 
conception of EU law in the decades after the ITL project, while clearly more ‘federalist 
friendly’, does call into question the future of law in the integration process at least as 
elaborated by the ITL project. The principled conception of law as elaborated primarily by 
Ronald Dworkin, was developed in respect of ‘communities of principle’ who enjoyed a 
‘collective political morality’
112
, that is to say, the state setting where there is a reasonable 
level of agreement regarding certain questions of justice and fairness. The importation of 
such a principled account of law to a supranational ‘emerging polity’ such as the EU, whose 
dimensions and nature remain ‘highly fluid’
113
, is another matter, however. 
It may be the case that the EU constitutional structure is now sufficiently robust to 
withstand the assimilation of (contested) principles of political morality into its conception of 
law. As the ITL project so effectively illustrated, law, specifically positive law, was central to 
the resilience of the constitutional structure. Should national and supranational judicial actors 
actively adopt the attitude to EU law endorsed by principled accounts of EU law in the 
constitutional pluralist literature, the resilience of this constitutional structure will surely be 
put to the test. 
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